





This paper studies a new coordination game, the Language Game, of a large
but nite population. The population is partitioned into two groups of identi-
cal agents. Each player shares a common two-action strategy set and interacts
pairwise with everyone else. Both symmetric proles are pareto-ecient strict
equilibria, but the groups rank them dierently. The prole where successful
coordination occurs only within-group, with each group adopting their most pre-
ferred action, is also an equilibrium provided the smaller group's preferences are
suciently strong. In all dynamically stable long run outcomes, players in the
same group adopt the same action. Three properties, that do not matter for
equilibrium selection in the homogeneous agent models of Kandori, Mailath, and
Rob (1993) and Young (1993), do matter in the Language Game. These are:
group size, preference over alternative equilibria, and rates of group adaptiveness
(\group dynamism"). A relative increase in group dynamism is always weakly
benecial.
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1\Nobody will ever win the battle of the sexes.
There's just too much fraternizing with the enemy."
- Henry Kissinger
1 Introduction
A large population coordination problem is one wherein all parties can realize mutual
gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions. Often, such mutually consis-
tent decisions require that everybody behave identically. For example: writing papers
in English is a must if that is the conventional medium; it makes sense to buy a MAC
if all your friends already own one; driving on the opposite side of the road as the
oncoming trac hardly seems wise; etc.
The emergence of coordinated outcomes in large societies, referred to as conventions
by Lewis (1969) and Young (1993, 1996, 2001), has been studied using the framework
of evolutionary game theory. In the canonical model, players are drawn from a homo-
geneous population and randomly matched to play a symmetric 2  2 game of pure
coordination. This situation is then repeated with players assumed to follow some
simple updating rule, that allows population behaviour to be tracked in a manageable
way. However, by construction, the canonical model can only be used for studying
the emergence of conventions in societies where all agents have the same preferences.
This is limiting, since in many situations of interest, like the adoption of technological
standards (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Arthur, 1989), people
often have dierent tastes, and so what might be best for some may not be best for all.
In this paper, I propose a new strategic situation, the \Language Game", that allows
the study of conventions in a heterogeneous environment. The population is composed
of not one, but two homogeneous groups. Each player has the same two-action strategy
set and interacts pairwise with everybody else. I assume that successful coordination
is good, while all types of failed coordination are bad. Precisely, a player's utility is
linearly increasing in the number of others who adopt the same action. Each player
has a most preferred coordinated outcome - the key feature is that these most preferred
outcomes dier across the groups.
Uniform adoption of either action is always a strict equilibrium (convention) of the
Language Game. If the smaller group has suciently strong preferences for one action
2over the other, then the prole where members of each group adopt their preferred
action and forfeit coordination with those of the other group, can also be supported as
an equilibrium. Such an outcome highlights one positive dierence between my model
and existing ones.
Next, the Language Game becomes the stage game of a repeated interaction. Time
is discrete, begins at t = 0, and goes forever. Payos are received every period and
actions for tomorrow must be chosen at the end of today. Following Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob (1993) (hereafter KMR), players are assumed (i) to be myopic, and thus
behave as though the following period is the last, and (ii) to exhibit some inertia, so
that not everybody reacts instantaneously to his/her environment. Whatever individual
best responses do get made in a given period are aggregated to obtain deterministic
(nonergodic) group dynamics. Any decentralized adjustment process with these features
will lock in on some convention with probability one.
The concept of stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990) enables crisp predic-
tions to be made about long run behaviour. The basic idea is that players occasionally,
and independently, choose non-optimal responses. These continual \mistakes" or \mu-
tations" perturb the dynamics in such a way that population behaviour now spends the
bulk of time in the neighbourhood of only certain selected conventions. Such equilibrium
selection in the Language Game depends on three factors: group size, group payos,
and how fast each group adapts.1 Increased rate of adapting and increased numbers are
always more likely to bring about a group's most preferred outcome. However, stronger
preferences need not always be desirable.
In the canonical model with only one homogeneous population, for any convention
each player's behaviour and payo are identical. As such, the literature has focused
primarily on the tension that arises when the \good" pareto-dominant equilibrium ac-
tion does not coincide with the \safe" risk-dominant one. Foster and Young (1990),
KMR and Young (1993) were the rst to show that evolutionary forces coupled with
mutations will propel population behaviour towards risk-dominance.2 While the deni-
1Rates of adapting, or \group dynamism", permits many interpretations. It can be thought of as
how sensitive on average a particular group is to their surroundings, or as the frequency of death and
replacement, or even as adjustment costs varying across groups since some nd change less burdensome.
2This negative result has generated a vast literature. The following papers show that the pareto-
dominant equilibrium action can emerge in similar settings. Ely (2002), Oechssler (1999) and Oechssler
(1997) are models with endogenous pairwise interactions, Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998) and Robson
and Vega-Redondo (1996) vary the frequency with which players may interact, while Kim and Sobel
3tion of risk-dominance, and hence of a risk dominant equilibrium, is not so clear in the
Language Game, the stochastically stable equilibria are never pareto-inecient. How-
ever, due to the existence of multiple pareto-ecient strict equilibria, not all welfare
measures rank conventions identically. So inecient outcomes may emerge although
the nature of the ineciency is dierent.
Ensuing work showed that the classic risk-dominance selection result is robust to
situations where players interact with only small sets of neighbours, rather than with the
population at large (see Ellison (1993), Blume (1993), Young (2001), and Peski (2010)).
It is quite a startling nding that altering network architecture cannot in any way
inuence equilibrium selection.3 However, this is simply a consequence of the fact that
all pairwise interactions are the same, which implies that each individual's coordination
problem is suciently similar, and hence in the presence of neighbours who occasionally
make mistakes so is optimal behaviour, i.e. choose the risk dominant action. The
Language game is a situation with more than one type of pairwise interaction, and
an immediate implication of moving it to a network, is that equilibrium selection is
highly sensitive to network topology. This issue is studied in a companion paper Neary
(2010a).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next Section, I present a simple example
that demonstrates how homogeneous groups with heterogeneous preferences can be a
more natural way to think about certain large population situations, and can provide
previously unexplored insights. The Language Game is formally dened in Section
3, where I also characterize the set of pure strategy equilibria. Section 4 shows how
decisions at the individual level are aggregated to yield group dynamics, and illustrates
via some examples how path dependence may be inuenced by the dynamics. This
analysis is carried forward to Section 5 which contains the main results on equilibrium
selection. Section 6 looks at welfare properties of the selected equilibria, while Section
7 examines how the set of selected equilibria varies as Language Game parameters
change. Section 8 concludes and discusses some potential avenues for future work.
(1995) add a round of costless communication, \cheap talk", before actions are taken.
3Ellison (1993) did note that network architecture can dramatically aect that speed at which
selection will occur, and further notes that if selection takes a long time to occur then perhaps the
validity of evolutionary forces should be called in to question.
42 A Story
The story is an extension of one from KMR. I begin by reminding the reader of theirs
and then building on it. There is a university dormitory of 10 identical students,
referred to as Group A. Each Group A student uses a computer system s chosen from
the set fa;bg. Each evening, the students assemble in the study hall, where everybody
encounters everyone else. When two students interact, they can collaborate by playing
games, sharing les, swapping add-ons, etc. But - and this is key - meetings are fruitful
if and only if both students use the same computer system. Assume that system a







where AI and AII are any pair of Group A students. GAA has two pure strategy
equilibria, (a;a) and (b;b), and a third equilibrium in mixed strategies, where each
player puts weight 1=3 on a. The population coordination problem has two pure strategy
equilibria in which all 10 students adopt a common system, a or b. These proles are
denoted by a and b respectively.
It is assumed, again following KMR, that students occasionally have the opportunity
to change their computer, and that students are myopic in that decisions are taken based
on the current distribution of computers. This generates Darwinian dynamics, in which
population behaviour is always drifting towards either a or b. Initial conditions are
key: if more than one third of the population begins using system a (4 or more since the
population is of size 10), then outcome a will be reached, while if 7 or more students
start out using b, then b will be the nal resting point. The reasoning is simple, all
players collectively agree on what action is a best response, so the best response today
must be at least as good a response tomorrow as the number of players taking that
action can only (weakly) increase.
However, when trembles or mistakes or experimentation are incorporated into the
dynamics, it is possible to select between strict equilibrium outcomes. Suppose that
5the probability that a student mistakenly chooses the computer that is not an optimal
response is given by ". It takes 4 or more simultaneously occurring mistakes to dislodge
the system from b, and 7 or more to get away from a. The most likely events of this
form occur with probability of orders "4 and "7 respectively. For small values of ",
"7  "4, and so KMR conclude that when agents are myopic best responders, who
occasionally make mistakes, that outcome a is far more likely to be observed in the
long run.
A key component of the above story was that system a is inherently superior to
system b. While in many coordination problems it is plausible to believe that coordi-
nation on one particular strategy is better (by any metric) than another, words like
\better" derive from primitive preferences, and preferences are individual by nature. In
a population with heterogeneous agents, what might be best for some may not be best
for all.
To illustrate the impact of adding heterogeneity, consider the following extension to
the above story. Suppose Group A are \slackers" - they must also do coursework on
their machines, but their main use for computers is playing games. Instead of assuming
that computer system a is at out better than b, let us suppose that system a more
readily supports gaming platforms, which justies Group A's underlying preference for
coordinating on it. Suppose further that there is another dorm of 5 more students in
the next building. This dorm is unconnected to the rst dorm, and I shall call those in
this dorm, Group B. Every night these 5 Group B students meet in a separate study
hall and exchange software, etc. Again, interactions are benecial if and only if the
pair involved share the same system. However, those in Group B are more \serious"
scholars, and platform b suits their scholarly needs better. The local-interaction between






where BI and BII are any two Group B students. By an identical analysis to that
given above for the Group A coordination problem, left to their own devices Group B
6will adopt computer system b in the long run.4 Now, consider the 15 person population
as a whole. Writing a group-symmetric prole5 as a vector, (sA;sB), with the Group
A prole written rst, there are 4 strict equilibria: (a;a);(a;b);(b;a);(b;b). One can
easily see, and it is quite intuitive, that the long run population prole will be (a;b). So
with both groups isolated, each group internally coordinates on its preferred outcome.
The situation changes when the dorms are connected. Suppose that in an eort
to free up space, the university stipulates that both groups should study in the larger
Group A study room which can accommodate 5 extra bodies. (This frees up the smaller
study room for other activities.) So now, all 15 students meet in the same room every
evening. Everybody interacts with everybody else, and within-group local-interactions
are as before. It remains to specify the local-interaction that occurs when students from
opposite groups meet. This is described by the coordination game GAB, in which the






GAB is not symmetric. It has two pareto-ecient pure strategy equilibria, (a;a)
and (b;b), over which players' preferences disagree. Considering the new coordination
problem, interactions are now occurring both within- and across-group. Each Group A
student interacts with 9 fellow Group A students and 5 Group B students, while each
Group B student interacts with 4 other Group B students and 10 Group A students.
The only group-symmetric equilibria to this new situation are (a;a) and (b;b).6 While
both are pareto-ecient, the 10 Group A students prefer (a;a), while the 5 Group B
students view (b;b) as most desirable.
I now pause and ask the reader to predict what they think the long run outcome
will be (recalling that (a;a) and (b;b) are the only viable candidates). One conjecture
might be the following. Even though behaviour evolves in a decentralised manner
4The probability of Group B transitioning from a to b occurs with probability of order "2, while
that of transitioning from b to a occurs with probability of order "4.
5A group-symmetric prole is one in which those in the same group take the same action. A
symmetric prole is group-symmetric, though plainly the reverse need not be true.
6While (a;b), and (b;a) were equilibria when the two groups were unconnected, they are no longer
equilibria when all students study together.
7via individual best responses, group preferences are mirrored so the greater Group
A numbers should somehow collectively force its preferred outcome, (a;a), onto the
population at large.
It turns out that the answer is subtle and depends on a variety of factors aside
from group sizes and group preferences. The rst of these is mistakes. In the original
story with only Group A, all agents were identical so assuming they all make time- and
prole-independent mistakes with equal probability seemed not completely unreason-
able. However, with a population composed of two types of agents, if Group A students
tremble with probability "A while Group B students tremble with probability "B, there
is no obvious reason to conclude that "A = "B.
The second complicating factor is a property I refer to as group dynamism. Group
dynamism can be thought of as the rate at which a group responds. It may be that
Group A students are more lethargic than Group B students. Perhaps on average only
one Group A student updates his action in a given period, whereas all Group B students
update their action every period. In the real world, there is no reason to suppose that
dierent groups respond at identical rates. In fact, often they do not.
However, with these caveats in mind, let's begin by assuming that: (1) payos are
as given in GAA, GAB and GBB; (2) the group sizes are 10 and 5 for Groups A and B
respectively; (3) mistakes are such that "A = "B = "; and (4) each period, both groups
evolve according to the best-reply dynamic in which all students react. Now, let us
calculate how easy it is to dislodge the population from each symmetric prole.
Suppose rst that the population prole is (b;b). Any Group B student needs to
see a minimum of 10 others taking action a in order to switch his/her action, while a
Group A student needs to see a minimum of 6. Let's say between 6 and 9 students
accidentally chose action a (it is not important how these students are distributed across
the two groups). In the following period, all Group B students choose action b, but all
Group A students choose action a, so that the new prole is (a;b). With no further
mistakes, all students take action a the following period. The conclusion is that 6 or
more simultaneous mistakes are sucient to shift the population from (b;b) to (a;a).
Now assume that the current prole is (a;a). Payos are mirrored so the 6-player
and 10-student bounds are still relevant. If between 6 and 9 mistakes occur whereby
students accidentally choose action b, it is enough to induce the 5 Group B students to
take action b, but not enough to induce the 10 Group A students to do so. Thus, next
8period's prole is (a;b), and with no further trembles, the system reverts to (a;a). It
can be computed that a minimum of 10 simultaneous mistakes are required to shift the
system from (b;b) to (a;a).
Transitioning from (a;a) to (b;b) requires an event that occurs with probability
of order "10, while transitioning from (b;b) to (a;a) one with probability of order "6.
For small values of ", the second transition is far more likely. So provided that: (i)
everybody interacts with everybody else; (ii) both groups respond according to best-
reply dynamics; (iii) the probability of a student making a mistake is small, equal
for all students, and independent of the current population prole; and (iv) payos
and group-sizes are as specied above. Then, the informal analysis concludes that the
unique long run outcome will be (a;a).
Now suppose that the groups adapt at dierent rates. Precisely: (1) payos are
as given in GAA, GAB and GBB; (2) the group sizes are 10 and 5 for Groups A and
B respectively; (3) mistakes are such that "A = "B = "; and (4) each period, Group
B evolves according to the best-reply dynamic, while only one Group A student best
responds. Again let us calculate how easy it is to dislodge the population from each of
the equilibria. The bounds of 6 and 10 are derived from preferences and group sizes,
not dynamics, so those have not changed. The dierence in this analysis is that it will
matter exactly who is making mistakes.
This time, start with the population at (b;b). Suppose 6 Group A students mistak-
enly choose a (it does matter that these 6 students are from Group A). Next period,
Group B students maintain taking action b, while one more Group A student adopts
action a, so that the total number taking action a is increased to 7. The following period
8 Group A students are using action a, and so on. Once all 10 Group A students are
taking action a, action a becomes optimal for Group B students who all immediately
adopt it. Thus, 6 of the \right kind" of mistakes are enough to transition from (b;b)
to (a;a).
Now let the current prole be (a;a), and suppose that 6 Group A students acciden-
tally choose action b, (again, it matters that these 6 students are from Group A). At
this new prole, Group preferences disagree. The reactiveness of the groups means that
the following period, all 5 Group B students adopt action b, while one of the 6 Group
A students who mistakenly chose action b reverts back to action a. Thus, there are 10
 
= 5 + (6   1)

students taking action b. This is enough for all Group B students to
9maintain action b and for Group A students to prefer action b. From this new situation,
by an analysis similar to the previous paragraph, the behaviour of the population moves
incrementally to (b;b).
Under these dierent dynamics, transitioning from (b;b) to (a;a) still occurs with
probability of order "6. More importantly however, the likelihood of transitioning from
(a;a) to (b;b) has been lowered to "6. So provided that: (i) everybody interacts
with everybody else; (ii) Group B best-replies, while Group A is more lethargic; (iii)
the probability of a student making a mistake is small, equal for all students, and
independent of the current state; and (iv) payos and group-sizes are as specied above.
Then, the informal analysis concludes that both symmetric outcomes are equally likely
to be observed in the long run.
So what, the reader might ask, is the point of this section? There is certainly no
hint of a crisp result like the risk-dominance prediction of KMR and Young (1993).7
But in fact, the lack of a clean result is precisely the point. That is, what prediction
results I do obtain, are incredibly fragile. That group size and strength of payos
aect long run behaviour is intuitive but not predicted by homogeneous agent case.
In that framework, once an equilibrium is risk-dominant it is selected (even though it
may be pareto-dominated to an arbitrary extent), and this is of course independent of
population size.
Once we move to the details of the dynamics the situation becomes even worse. It is
well known (Bergin and Lipman, 1996) that any strict equilibrium may be selected with
appropriately dened mutations. However, the risk-dominance result is robust to both
uniform errors and also payo dependent errors (Blume, 1993). This is not the case
for the Language Game described above - though given that strength of payos aect
selection even under uniform errors, it is unsurprising that payo dependent dynamics
yield dierent selection results.
7I am applying existing selection techniques to a new strategic situation, and in this situation it is
unclear how concepts like risk-dominance ought be dened. One might be tempted to suggest that the
prole (a;b) is risk-dominant, but for the parameters given above this prole is not an equilibrium.
Thus we would be in the unusual situation of having the risk-dominant prole be unstable.
103 The Language Game
3.1 The Model
The Language Game, G, is dened as the tuple fN;;S;Gg, where N := f1;:::;Ng
is the population of players;  := fA;Bg is a partition of N into two nonempty ho-
mogeneous groups A, B of sizes NA, NB ( 2) respectively; S := fa;bg is the set
of actions common to all players; G :=

GAA;GAB;GBB	
is the collection of pairwise
local-interactions, where GAA is the exchange that occurs whenever a player from Group



















a p;1   q 0;0
b 0;0 q;1   p
The Language Game is a simultaneous move game, in which players do not ran-
domize. Utilities are the sum of payos earned from playing the eld, where the same
action must be used with one and all.8 I assume that p;q 2 (1=2;1), so Group A mem-
bers prefer to coordinate on a, and Group B prefer to coordinate on b. Even though
within-group local-interactions are constrained symmetric while those across-group are
not, note that all local-interactions are opponent independent in that a player's payo
depends only on the actions chosen and not the other player's identity.9 Thus a player
8While this has a dierent interpretation to a game of random matching, strategic behaviour is the
same in both.
9This is obviously a gross simplication and may not be applicable for many real world situations.
See Neary (2010b) for extensions of this model to situations where not only the value of successful
coordination may be opponent dependent, but even what might be the optimal action with one Group
may not be optimal with another, e.g. coordination `vs' anti-coordination.
11cares only about the number of others expected to choose the same action, and not on
who those others are.
With only two types of agents, population behaviour can be written concisely. Let












state ! 2 
, dene na = [!]A + [!]B, and nb = N   na. The utility a player in group










N   na   1











N   na   1

q (4)
Before discussing individual behaviour, I should mention genericity. Letting N :=
f1;2;:::g, the set of Language Games can be parameterized by  = f(NA;NB;p;q) :
NA;NB 2 Nnf1g;p;q 2 (1=2;1)g. For a given game G 2  and a given group K 2 ,
the statement \if there does not exist a state ! 2 
 such that UK(a;!) = UK(b;!)",
will be abbreviated to \genK". If there exists such a state, the shorthand is \ngenK".
The subset of the parameter space for which any indierence occurs can easily be shown
to have a closure of measure zero, and so when both genA and genB, following standard
terminology I say G is generic. Otherwise, G is nongeneric.
3.2 Individual Behaviour
Let R denote the real line, and R+ its positive part. For any x 2 R, let dxe :=









































= d(1   q)N + (2q   1)e (8)
10The values given are for generic G. For the relevant nongeneric case, increase the values by 1.
12nA
a is the number of players taking action a for a player from Group A to strictly




a . This appears
to suggest that the strategic situation is mirrored for groups A and B. While this is
true at the individual level, it need not be true at the level of the group.
Let 
A;ab and 
B;ab denote the set of states such that A players and B players



















































B;ba are dened likewise but for weak preference.
Generically, these sets of weak- and strict-preference coincide. Letting  () denote
weak (strict) inclusion, we have the following lemma whose simple proof is omitted.







An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that, even non-generically, there is no
state such that members of both groups are simultaneously indierent, i.e. ngenA and
ngenB cannot both hold.
The interpretation of the lemma is as follows. Fix a state !. If all members of
Group B (A) weakly prefer action a (b) at this particular state, then this same action is
the unique best response for all members of Group A (B), and hence is a best response
for the population as a whole. It does not say that if action a (b) is preferred by
Group A (B), it must simultaneously be preferred by Group B (A). That is, there may
exist a state such that group preferences dier. The following provides mild sucient
conditions for the existence of such a state.
Lemma 2. If either
 N is even, or








Proof. The proof is found in Appendix C.
3.3 Equilibria
Behaviour at states (0;0);(0;NB);(NA;0), and (NA;NB), is referred to as group-
symmetric for obvious reasons. These four states will appear repeatedly throughout
the paper, and are denoted by !bb;!ba, !ab, and !aa respectively. For a given game,
G, let E(G) denote the set of group-symmetric equilibria. With an abuse of termi-
nology, I will refer to E(G) as the equilibrium set, since it turns out (Section 4) that
group-symmetric equilibria are the only serious candidates for long run behaviour. The
following Theorem, stated without proof, classies E(G) for various parameters.
Theorem 1. In the Language Game, G,
1. State !aa is always a strict equilibrium.
2. State !bb is always a strict equilibrium.
3. State !ba is never an equilibrium.







Parts 1 - 2 of Theorem 1 are easily understood, since deviating from a symmetric
prole means failing to coordinate with everyone in the population. Part 3 is also very
simple. One of the groups must be (weakly) smaller, and at state !ba, members of this
(weakly) smaller group observe strictly more than half the players in the population
adopting their preferred action. Hence they wish to deviate.
The intuition for part 4 is as follows. State !ab involves each player successfully
coordinating on their most preferred action with only those from his/her own group.
To sustain !ab as an equilibrium, the high payos earned from within-group interactions,
14must exceed those that could be earned from successful coordination with the members
of the other group on a less preferred action. This requires the product of \own group
size" and \preferred local-interaction payo" be suciently large for each player. That
is, a player must either be part of the larger group, or part of a group with a strong
relative preference for one action over the other, or both. The inequality for the larger
group clearly always holds, and so one must only check that of the smaller group.
While Theorem 1 is simple, it is also intuitive. The following two examples, which
are carried throughout the paper, illustrate precisely why. They further demonstrate
that while both symmetric proles are socially ecient, members of the dierent groups
prefer dierent ones. This observation stimulates the discussion of welfare in Section 6.
Example 1. Let G1 = (10;5;3=5;2=3).
For these parameters !ab is not an equilibrium, because from this state Group B players
have an incentive to deviate to action a. Precisely, the second inequality of part 4 in
Theorem 1 does not hold. The reader can check that the rst inequality of part 4 in
Theorem 1, relevant to Group A players, does hold, as it must since Group A is the
larger group.
Example 2. Let G2 = (10;5;3=5;5=6).
Group B members now have a stronger relative preference for coordinating on action b
over action a. As in Example 1, the rst inequality of Theorem 1 part 4, for !ab to be
an equilibrium holds (there is no need to recheck as parameters relevant to Group A
are the same as they were in G1). This time however, the inequality relevant to Group
B members also holds. While group B still has only half as many members as group A,
the relative reward for coordinating on action b over action a for group B members has
increased suciently that even coordinating with a small number of players on their
most preferred action can compensate for the larger number of failed coordinations.
4 Evolutionary Dynamics
4.1 Specication
Now suppose the Language Game becomes the stage game of a repeated interaction.
Time is discrete, begins at t = 0, and goes forever. Utilities are received every period
15and actions for tomorrow are chosen at the end of today. I avail of precisely the
assumptions placed on individual behaviour from KMR's evolutionary model.
Assumption 1. Inertia: At the end of each period, a nonempty subset of players are
provided with the opportunity to revise their strategy for the following period.
Assumption 2. Myopia: When a player does react, he best responds to the current
environment.
One possible explanation put forward for high inertia is that in many situations
changing an action is a costly excercise. Another is that players observe only slices of
information so their understanding of the game may be imperfect, and that this may
cause them to stand by the status quo for longer than might be optimal. Myopia usefully
captures the notion that players are boundedly rational and/or do not understand the
dynamics of the population at large. Furthermore, it follows quite naturally for systems
with high inertia, since in this case, a best response against the current population
prole should not only generate a high payo tomorrow, but also a \pretty good"
payo for some time in near the future.
Aggregating responses from the individual level to the population level, the evolution

















Group dynamics. Following from myopia, strategic decisions are made by looking back
at today's environment, and making a choice of action for tomorrow, based on what
would have been an ideal strategy to have held earlier today. However, since there is
inertia, perhaps not all agents myopically best respond every period. Thus, each of 	A
and 	B possess the \Darwinian" property of KMR, so that 	 satises the following
denition.
Denition 1 (Group-Darwinian Adjustment Process). Say that 	 = (	A;	B) has the
Group-Darwinian Property if, for any K 2 fA;Bg,
161. for all ! 62















2.  	K(!) = 0, if [!]K = 0 and UK(a;!)  UK(b;!)
 	K(!) = NK, if [!]K = NK and UK(a;!)  UK(b;!)
Group-Darwinianism naturally extends the Darwinian property of KMR to a situ-
ation with multiple groups. It is similar, in that it makes the standard evolutionary
assumption that better strategies are no worse represented next period. But it is dier-
ent since, (i) for certain states, groups may disagree over which strategies are \better"
(Lemma 2), and (ii) the rate at which each group's best responses are better represented
next period is left unspecied, and need not be the same across groups.
As time proceeds the population reacts every period, and so interest lies in repeated
applications of 	. For all !, let 	0(!) = !, and for m 2 N dene the m-fold repetition




. Dene the set of rest points, 
0 :=
f! j	(!) = !g  
. It can easily be shown that for each ! 2 
, there exists ^ ^ m(!),
such that for all m  ^ ^ m(!), 	m(!) 2 
0. Finally, let ^ m := max! ^ ^ m(!), and for each
! 2 
0, dene the basin of attraction of ! by V(!) := f!0 j8m  ^ m;	m(!0) = !g.
Generically, 
0 = E(G), and so the state space can be partitioned into fV(!)g!2E(G).
When ngenA, it is possible that (nA
a   1;0) 2 
0, and when ngenB, it may be that
(NA;NB   nB
b + 1) 2 
0.
When Lemma 2 holds, the basins of attraction depend on the exact specication
of 	. Keeping track of these is of prime concern for issues of equilibrium selection in
Section 5. To assist in this, dene a partial ordering on 
 as follows. If ! and !0 are
elements of 
, write ! >a !0, if [!]A  [!0]A and [!]B  [!0]B. That is, ! >a !0 if,
in state !, there are (weakly) more players in both groups taking action a. The pair
(
;>a) is a complete lattice with bottom element !bb and top element !aa.11
While the Group-Darwinian property of Denition 1 seems appealing at rst, the
class of dynamics satisfying it is still too broad to show general results. The following
additional constraint placed on the dynamics will make tracking of population behaviour
easier.
11Lattices are briey discussed in Appendix A.
17Denition 2 (Monotonic Adjustment Process). Say that 	 : 
 ! 
 is monotonic, if







It is easy to construct adaptive processes satisfying Denition 1, but not Denition
2, and vice versa. I limit attention to the class of dynamics satisfying both Denitions,
and refer to these to as monotone Group-Darwinian processes. Soon I place further
restrictions on this class, but rst, a useful result.
Lemma 3. For any monotonic Group-Darwinian process, and any state ! 2 
0, the
set V(!) is convex.
Proof. The proof is contained in Appendix C.
The tractable subclass of monotonic Group-Darwinian dynamics on which I focus,
are those where each group responds at a constant rate. The relative rates at which
groups adapt is a property I term group-dynamism.




, such that for all ! 2 
, and all t,
	




maxf0;[!t]K   Kg; if UK(a;!t) < UK(b;!t);
[!t]K ; if UK(a;!t) = UK(b;!t);
min

[!t]K + K; NK	
; if UK(a;!t) > UK(b;!t);
Denition 4. Say that 	 is a constant rate dynamic if both groups adapt at constant




Constant rate dynamics have a simple interpretation. Next period, a xed number
of new agents from each group adopt that group's best response (provided this new
number, when added to the original number of agents who were already taking that
action, does not exceed the size of the group). The best-reply dynamic, B := (BA;BB),
is a constant rate dynamic with A = NA and B = NB. I now dene what it means
for one group to be more dynamic than the other. Clearly, best-replying will be the
most reactive a group can be.
18Denition 5. If 	 is a constant rate dynamic, say that Group K 2 fA;Bg is (weakly)





Groups adapt at the same rate, 	A d 	B, if neither is more dynamic. Formally,




NA   1;NB   1
		
, or (ii) one of the
following holds:
 
A = NA  B  NB
or
 
B = NB  A  NA
. The rst condition
says that neither group best-replies, and, whenever possible, next period equal numbers
of new agents from each group adopt that group's best response. The second says that
if the smaller of the two groups is best-replying, then even if, whenever possible, the
larger group has more agents reacting each period, both groups are still said to be
evolving at the same rate.
Armed with Denitions 3-5, it will now be possible to make positive statements
about varying dynamics. Normative statements are more problematic. While increased
adaptiveness is a desirable property in the Language Game (Section 5), that is because
locally risk-dominant actions coincide with most-preferred equilibrium actions. If these
actions did not accord, then greater group dynamism could be detrimental.12
4.2 Path Dependence
In KMR, dynamics are dened on a linear state space, and when the common local-
interaction is a game of pure coordination, generically there are two rest points, one
at either end. KMR emphasize that path dependence of population behaviour rests
crucially on the initial conditions, but that the nal outcome is \independent ... to all
but the coarsest features of the dynamics". The intuition for this was discussed in the
story of Section 2. Loosely, once the process starts heading in a particular direction, it
cannot \turn around". However, in the Language Game, the nal outcome can depend
not only on the initial state, !0, but also on the exact specication of the dynamics.
To illustrate how path dependence may be sensitive to both the initial conditions




= f(10;5);(3=5;2=3)g. Figure 1 shows the state space 
 as an
12That is, to be part of a less dynamic (\lazier") group may be desirable in certain situations.
Thanks to Frances Ruane for originally pointing this out.
1911  6 lattice, with [!]A 2 f0;:::;10g on the horizontal-axis, and [!]B 2 f0;:::;5g on
the vertical-axis. Each state is depicted by a circle. The set of blue circles is 
A;ba,
while those red circles comprise 





(7;9;10;6), calculated using equations 5-8. At the states depicted by hollow circles,

A;ab \
















































































A large circle denotes a rest point. Corner states !bb and !aa are always rest points,
while corner state !ab is a rest point if the conditions of Theorem 1 part 4 are satised.
While states (nA
a   1;0) and (NA;NB   nB
b + 1) can be rest points non-generically, no
other state can be. Example 1 is generic and the conditions of Theorem 1 part 4 are not
satised, and so in Figure 1, the only two rest points are !bb = (0;0) and !aa = (10;5).
To understand Group-Darwinianism, consider the state (5;3). Since (5;3) 2 
A;ab\





2 f6;:::;10g  f0;1;2g. While monotonicity is not
shown in Figure 1, it is also easily understood when coupled with Group-Darwinianism.






































0, further information on the details of the dynamics are
20needed. To see how these details can matter, it is instructive to start by looking at
behaviour at individual states for varying dynamics.13
Example 3 (	 = (BA;BB)). From Figure 1, the interpretation is easy: no matter
what the current state, the following state must be !bb;!ab, or !aa. Blue states jump
immediately to !bb, black states to !ab, and red states to !aa. Formally, for any ! 2

A;ba, 	(!) = B(!) = !bb; for any ! 2 
B;ab, 	(!) = B(!) = !aa; and for any
! 2 
A;ab \ 
B;ba, B(!) = !ab and B2(!) = !aa. That is, states in 
A;ab \ 
B;ba
transition rst to !ab, and from there to !aa, and so with 	 = B, are considered red.
Example 4 (	 = (	A
1 ;BB)). Figure 2 illustrates the basins of attraction for this
scenario. As before, states in 
B;ab are denoted by solid red circles, and states in

A;ba by solid blue circles. States for which the groups have conicting preferences,

B;ba \ 
A;ab, are again denoted by hollow circles. However, it is not the case that

B;ba \ 
A;ab  V(!aa), as it was when 	 = B. Hollow red circles eventually lead
to 





























































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 2: V(!bb) and V(!aa) when 	 = (	A
1 ;BB).
To be clear what is happening, again consider state (5;3). When 	 = (BA;BB)
as in Example 3, the dynamics terminate at (10;5) via the path f(5;3) ! (10;0)
13The formal analysis of how basins of attraction vary across constant rate adaptive processes is
carried out in Appendix B.
21! (10;5)g. When 	 = (	A
1 ;BB) as in Example 4, (5;3) leads to (0;0), via the path
f(5;3) ! (6;0) ! (5;0) ! (4;0) ! (3;0) ! (2;0) ! (1;0) ! (0;0)g.
We can also trace how the boundaries of the basins of attraction vary.14 When
	A d 	B, all basins of attraction, and hence their boundaries, are the same.15 By
Lemma 3, for any monotone dynamics the basins will be convex. This is easily seen by










































Any deterministic Group-Darwinian dynamic, 	, induces a time-homogeneous Markov
process on the nite state space 
. Let P be the associated Markov matrix, where for
every pair of states !0;!00 2 
, P(!0;!00)  0 denotes the probability of transitioning
from !0 to !00, and for each ! 2 
,
P
!0 P(!;!0) = 1.
For any nite set X, let 4(X) denote the set of distributions on X. A stationary
distribution of P is a row-vector  2 4(
), such that P = . The set of stationary
distributions is denoted 40(
). Writing supp() for the support of , say that D  

is a recurrent class, if for all ! 2 
, and all  2 40(
) with supp()  D, (!) >
0 () ! 2 D. A state is recurrent if it is contained in a recurrent class, and transient
otherwise. A singleton recurrent class is an absorbing state.
14The boundaries, both upper (lower) and total upper (total lower), are dened in Appendix A.
15In fact, this statement holds true under the weaker condition that A  nA
a and B  nB
b .
22All Markov processes possess at least one stationary distribution, while ergodic
Markov processes possess only one. The third assumption of KMR, perturbs the deter-
ministic dynamics in such a way as to induce a new Markov process that is ergodic.16
Assumption 3. Behavioural Mutation: There is a small probability that an agent may
choose an action at random.
One interpretation is as follows. After aorded decisions have been taken, but before
payos are made, with probability "A > 0 ("B > 0) each Group A (B) player switches
his current action choice, and with probability 1   "A (1   "B) maintains his action.17
Even for constant rate dynamics, there is no grounds for always assuming 	A d 	B.
Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that behavioural mutations occur with equal
likelihood for members of dierent groups.18 So while interest will lie in the case where
("A;"B) ! (0;0), I will be making the strong assumption that "A = "B = ", for all states
and all time periods. It is tempting to insist on a milder condition like "A = O("B) and
"B = O("A),19 but the selection results may dier.20
For a given " > 0, the above perturbations dene a new ergodic Markov process with
associated transition matrix P ", and unique stationary distribution ". By continuity,
the accumulation point of f"g">0, ?, is a stationary distribution of P := lim"#0 P ".
Our interest lies in the states to which ? assigns positive probability.
Denition 6. State ! is stochastically stable if ?(!) > 0, and uniquely stochastically
stable if ?(!) = 1. Let 
? denote the set of stochastically stable states.
Write L for the collection of recurrent classes. For the Language Game, it can be
shown that L = ff!gg!2
0, where 
0 is the set of rest points as dened in Section 4.
16Technically this assumption makes the process irreducible and aperiodic which for nite state
Markov processes is sucient for ergodicity. See Karlin and Taylor (1975).
17This is a dierent interpretation to that given in KMR, but it generates the same switching
probabilities.
18Nor is there any reason to suppose mutations are both state- and time-independent. The eects
that subtle dierences in mutation rates can have on equilibrium selection are examined in Bergin and
Lipman (1996).




as " # 0, if and only if
there exists positive numbers M and , such that "A(")  jM"B(")j for all " < .
20However, this should not be muddled with the results of Bergin and Lipman (1996) (see footnote
18 above). To my knowledge, there are no games for which the Ising model dynamics of Blume (1993)
select dierent long run equilibria to the dynamics of KMR. In Neary (2010a), I show how these two
dynamics can arrive at dierent selection results for an open set of parameters for the Language Game.
23We can express 
? as the union of recurrent classes as follows






Calculating ? is the objective. This is done using tree-surgery techniques from
Freidlin and Wentzell (1998), rst introduced to game theory in Foster and Young
(1990). To do so, it will be useful to view states in 
 as the vertices of a fully connected
directed graph,  ?. An edge in  ? from !0 to !00 is denoted (!0 ! !00). A walk from
!0 to !00 is a sequence of edges f(!i ! !i+1)g
m 1
i=0 where !0 = !0, and !m = !00. A
path is a walk in which the vertices are distinct. A typical path from !0 to !00 is
denoted by h(!0;!00), and the set of all paths from !0 to !00 by H(!0;!00). Extending
this, the set of all paths from a state ! to a set Q 63 ! can be dened as follows,
H(!;Q) = [!02QH(!;!0).










where c	 : 
  
 ! R+ [ f1g is a cost function. The value it takes for a particular
pair (!0;!00) is interpreted as the minimum number of simultaneous mutations needed
to transition directly from !0 to !00, or in graph theoretic terms, as the cost of edge
(!0 ! !00) in  ?.21
For any function  : 
 ! 
, a path from !0 to !00 in , is a path f(!0 ! !1);(!1 !
!2), :::;(!m 1 ! !m)g, where !0 = !0 and !m = !00, such that (!i) = !i+1 for all
i = 0;:::;m   1. An !-tree, !, is a mapping ! : 
 ! 
 such that: (i) !(!) = !;
(ii) for every !0 2 
nf!g, there is a unique path in ! from !0 to !. Say that !00 is a
successor of !0 in ! if m
! (!0) = !00 for some m  1, and the immediate successor if
m = 1.
For each !, T! is the set of all !-trees. The cost of !-tree, ! 2 T!, is the sum of
21Note that c	 is allowed to take the value 1. This could be the case if a transition is impossible
under the dynamics. In this paper, the range of c	 is the range of k;k which is f0;:::;Ng.










For the Language Game, G, and cost function, c	, dene the set of states that achieve













The following is the result of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998). Note it's relation to Deni-
tion 6 above.
Lemma 4. State ! is stochastically stable if ! 2 (G;c	), and uniquely stochastically
stable if f!g = (G;c	). That is, (G;c	) = 
?.
By Young (1993), Theorem 4, the stochastically stable states are contained in a
recurrent class. We can therefore restrict attention to minimum cost !-trees of recurrent
states. For the Language Game, L = ff!gg!2
0, and V(!0)\V(!00) = ; for all distinct
!0;!00 2 
0. Thus, the key to computing !-trees of the absorbing states, is to nd a
path of minimum cost from each absorbing state to the convex basin of attraction of
the others. For any pair of states !0;!00 2 
, denote by c?
	(!0;!00) the cost of the path











The two main results in this Section concern equilibrium selection. Before presenting
these however, the following Lemma is needed. It says that a path of minimum cost
out of a region of the state space in which the dynamics are unambiguous, involves a
direct transition out. An immediate and important consequence is that it holds for the
symmetric proles !bb and !aa.
Lemma 5. Let 	 be a monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment process. Then,
1. For all ! 2 




















2. For all ! 2 



















However, the paths h? and h?? above attaining these minimum costs need not be unique.
Proof. The proof is found in Appendix C.
Generically 
A;ba  V(!bb) and 
B;ab  V(!aa). So all that remains is to classify





. It turns out that the behaviour of the dynamics






has more of an eect than when E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag. The analysis of each
case is quite dierent and so are looked at separately. The second case is easier to begin
with.
5.1 Equilibrium set is f!bb;!ab;!aag
We begin by calculating the minimum cost !-trees of each convention, when the groups
adapt at constant and equal rates.
Theorem 2. Suppose Condition 4 of Theorem 1 holds, so E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag, and
that the monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment process is such that both groups evolve
at constant and equal rates. Let ?
!bb, ?
!ab, and ?
!aa, denote minimum cost !-trees for






























The details are found in Appendix C. Here I discuss the intuition. The proof rests on
computing paths of minimum cost between the six pairs of coventions, (!bb;!ab);(!bb;!aa),
(!ab;!bb);(!ab;!aa);(!aa;!bb), and (!aa;!ab). By Lemma 5, the minima of c	(h0) over















































for some m  0
o
Next, use Lemma 8 to show that the minima of c	(h0) over all h0 2 H(!ab;!bb), and of

















































for some m  0
o
Lastly, note that when both groups adapt at constant and equal rates, V(!ab) is \sand-
wiched" between V(!bb) and V(!aa). That is, for all !0 2 V(!bb) and !00 2 V(!aa) with
!0 6a !00, there exists ^ ! 2 V(!ab) such that !0 6a ^ ! 6a !00. Using this, it is easily









where h?(!bb;!ab);h?(!ab;!aa);h?(!aa;!ab), and h?(!ab;!bb) are as given above. That
these are the only costly paths of the respective !-trees with costs as given in equations
15-17 is clear. That the set of stochastically stable states are those with !-tree of
minimum cost is immediate by Lemma 4.
27I now show (Theorem 3) that when !ab is stochastically stable under constant rate
dynamics where both groups adapt at equal rates, the set of stochastically stable equi-
libria is independent of the specics of the dynamics. What happens is this. First,
varying rates of adjustment will never lower the cost ?
!ab. Showing this is straightfor-
ward. Second, while it may lower the cost of ?
!bb or ?
!aa, it will not lower the cost
enough to alter selection. That is, Theorem 3 does not say that the minimum cost
!-tree of each convention is necessarily unchanged and as given by equations 15-17.
Rather it just says that if !ab is ever stochastically stable for some constant rate dy-
namic, it will always be for any constant rate dynamic and it will have !-tree with cost
given by that in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Suppose Condition 4 of Theorem 1 holds, so E = f!bb;!ab;!aag, and that
the monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment process is such that both groups evolve at
constant rates. If !ab 2 (G;c	) when 	A d 	B, then !ab 2 (G;c	) for any constant
rate adaptive process. Futhermore, states in (G;c	) have !-tree of minimum cost equal
to that as given in Theorem 2.
Proof. The proof is found in Appendix C.
This is a good time to mention a few features of the set up. Ellison (2000) introduced
the notions of the radius and coradius of a recurrent class. The radius is dened as
the minimum number of mutations necessary to escape the basin, while the coradius is
dened as the maximum (over all states) of the minimum number of mutations necessary
to reach the basin. When the radius is greater than the coradius, then the long run
equilibrium belongs to this recurrent class. The result is not universally powerful since
it does not apply in all cases. In the Language Game, it need not have relevance when
E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag, since it is possible that each rest point's coradius is larger than
its radius.
Another observation is that due to the 2-dimensional nature of the state space, there
need not be a connection between the size of each convention's basin and stochastic
stability.22 In fact, it is very possible that the equilibrium with the largest basin of
attraction is not stochastically stable, and that the equilibrium with the smallest basin
is stochastically stable. This can be particularly striking for parameters for which
E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag.
22A similar though slightly dierent point is made in Section 8 of Young (1993).
28The following example illustrates both these phenomena, and also provides the
intuition behind Theorems 2 and 3. For completeness' sake, we choose non-generic
parameters.
Example 5. Let G3 = (10;10;4=5;2=3).






Figure 3 below illustrates the basins of attraction when both groups respond at
equal rates. The non-genericity is on display by denoting the non-equilibrium rest point




j = 1, jV(!bb)j = 28,






































































































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 3: V(!bb) = . V(!ab) = . V(!aa) = .


















!ab can be computed as 17, 12, and 15 respectively. By Theorem 2, !aa is the selected
long run equilibrium, and this is despite it not having the maximal basin of attraction.
The [radius, coradius] pair for each absorbing state can also easily be calculated.
They are given as follows, !bb 7! [7;12], !ab 7! [3;8], !aa 7! [7;11], and (10;3) 7! [1;10].
Conventions !bb and !aa have equal radii, while !bb has maximal coradius. Note that
all rest points have a greater coradius than radius so the Theorem of Ellison (2000)
does not apply.
29Let us now vary the rates of reaction for each group. First of all, note that regardless
of rates, there exist some states at which the dynamics are unambiguous. These states
are illustrated in Figure 4 and are colour coded by the convention to which they lead.
The states not shown are a subset of 
A;ab \
B;ba, are were part of V(!ab) in Figure
3 when both groups responded at equal rates. We will demonstrate how Figure 4 is































































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 4: V(!bb) = . V(!ab) = . V(!aa) = .
Begin by supposing 	 = (BA;	B
1 ). Basins of attraction for this case are illustrated
in Figure 5. Rest point (10;3) now has a non-degenerate basin of attraction, with
states denoted by s. Basin V(!bb) is as it was when 	A d 	B. It is now the case





B;ba j [!]B  5
	





j = 7, jV(!bb)j = 28, jV(!ab)j = 21, and jV(!aa)j = 65. By
Theorem 3, it must still be that (G;c	) = f!aag. It is easily calculated that minimum
cost !-trees for the absorbing states have not changed.
While radii are always unaected by varying reaction rates, the coradii of absorbing
states !aa and (10;3) have changed. The [radius, coradius] pairs are now given as
follows, !bb 7! [7;12], !ab 7! [3;8], !aa 7! [7;7], and (10;3) 7! [1;7]. It is still the case
that no rest point has a greater coradius than radius so the result of Ellison (2000)
remains inapplicable.
Now suppose 	 = (	A












































































































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 5: V(!bb) = . V(!ab) = . V(!aa) = .
Theorem 6, the minimum cost !aa-, !ab-, and (10;3)-trees still have cost of 11, 15,
and 17 respectively. Consider the minimum cost !bb-tree. The cost of 12 remains












. This !bb-tree also has






































































































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 6: V(!bb) = . V(!ab) = . V(!aa) = .
The following modication hints at how rates can aect minimum cost !-trees
enough to alter selection. Suppose for a moment that the Group B payos were per-
31turbed so that the game became generic with (10;3) 2 
A;ba. With kA = kB, we get
c	(?
!bb) = 12, c	(?
!ab) = 15, and c	(?
!aa) = 10. Suppose now that 	 = (	A
1 ;BB).
The minimum cost !aa-tree still has a cost 10. The cost of the minimum cost !bb-tree
however, has lowered to 11 by proceeding along the route described in the previous
paragraph. But lowering it from 12 to 11 is not enough to aect equilibrium selection
in this case. However, this feature is not robust as was stated in Theorem 3.
5.2 Equilibrium set is f!bb;!aag
Now we examine the case when only the symmetric proles are equilibria.
Theorem 4. Suppose Condition 4 of Theorem 1 does not hold, so E = f!bb;!aag, and
that the monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment process is such that both groups evolve
at constant rates, A and B respectively. Let ?
!bb and ?
!aa, denote the minimum cost
!-trees for !bb and !aa respectively. Then,











































































Proof. The proof is found in Appendix C.
32Some things are worth noting. Clearly the state !ab plays an important role. Since
it is not an equilibrium, it always lies in the basin of attraction of the larger group's




subset of V(!aa). When !ab 2 V(!aa), then the selected long run equilibrium might
change if 	B d 	A. When !ab 2 V(!bb) the reverse holds. Appendix B shows how to
construct basins of attraction when the smaller group responds at a faster rate.
Suppose Group A is the larger group. The minimum cost of an !aa-tree is nA
a
(since (nA
a;0) 2 V(!aa)), while a lower bound for the minimum cost !bb-tree is nB
b
(if (NA   nB
b ;NB)). Thus, Group B must have a stronger relative preference for its
preferred equilibrium to reverse the long run outcome. Conversely, if Group A has an
equally strong preference, then (a;a) will always be a stochastically stable state.
Theorem 4 has a nice geometric interpretation, that can be seen by referring back
to Figures 1 and 2 which regard Example 1. From equation 5, nA
a = 7  NA, and
therefore (NA;0) 2 V(!aa). Figure 1 represents the basins of attraction when kA = kB.









. Thus when kA = kB, clearly !aa is the stochastically stable
outcome.
Now look at Figure 2 representing the basins of attraction when 	 = (	A
1 ;	B
2 ). The




, is still an edge
on a path of minimum cost from !bb to V(!aa). The cost of the minimum cost !bb-tree




is the rst edge
on a path of minimum cost from !aa to V(!bb). This has a cost of 7. So the long run
distribution assigns positive probability to both !bb and !aa.
Consider Figure 1 and suppose that 	 = (	A
1 ;	B
3 ). Note that !ba 2 
A;ba and so

















= (5;3), and by equation 20,
















Now, we have that V(!bb) = 
A;ba [ (B^ n \ 
A;ab) = f(3;5);(4;4);(5;3);(6;1)g
#.
Having classied conditions for which the various equilibria are selected, the next
Section compares the selected equilibrium to those a planner might want to induce.
6 Stability versus Welfare
When the population is homogeneous, players collectively agree on what action they
\would like to have taken" earlier today, and hence what they will choose for tomorrow
if aorded a revision opportunity. The main issue in existing large population coor-
dination problems is the tension between eciency and risk-dominance. Both KMR
and Young (1993) show that the risk dominant action will emerge under perturbed
best response based dynamics. This result is negative in the sense that the locally
risk-dominant equilibrium action need not coincide with the pareto dominant one, and
may have payos that are dominated to an arbitrary extent.
In the Language Game, pareto eciency is useless as a selection device. Both sym-
metric proles are socially ecient equilibria, and there is never uniform preference
over these. The purpose of this Section is to rank proles in E(G) according to vari-
ous welfare criteria, and then compare this ranking to the outcome(s) selected by the
dynamics. To infer how members of the population rank proles in E(G), it suces to
analyse the situation from the perspective of any one agent from each Group.
Theorem 5. Within the set of group-symmetric proles:23
1. !aa and !bb are always socially ecient.
23Again, this Theorem is stated for correctly specied utility functions, and not those as given by
equations (1)-(4). See footnote ??.
342. !ab is socially ecient if and only if
p 
N   1
2N   NB   2
and q 
N   1
2N   NA   2
(18)
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
A natural question to ask is the relationship between social eciency and equilib-
rium. It turns out that a socially ecient prole must be an equilibrium, but not all
equilibria are socially ecient.
Theorem 6. If !ab is socially ecient, then it must be an equilibrium. But !ab may
be an equilibrium without being socially ecient.
Proof. Follows from conditions in part 4 of Theorem 1, and those in part 2 of Theorem
5. Clearly the second implies the rst, while the rst need not imply the second.
Recall the examples from Section 3. In Example 1, with G1 = (10;5;3=5;3=5) and








= f28=5;42=5g. The 10 Group A members desire !aa, while the 5 in Group B pre-










fUA(!bb); UB(!bb)g = f28=5;140=6g. Note that !ab is pareto dominated by !bb, and so
provides an example of Theorem 6 at work.
The next obvious question is whether or not a decentralized adjustment process can
ever select a socially-inecient convention. In Example 2, !ab is socially inecient but
not stochastically stable. Theorem 7 shows that this is generalizable.
Theorem 7. Suppose E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag. For any Group-Darwinian adjustment
process, 	, it will never be the case that !ab is socially inecient and yet !ab 2 (G;c	).
Proof. The proof is found in Appendix C.
There are a host of other commonly used social welfare criteria from the theory of
social choice. Other interesting ones to apply here are the Utilitarian Welfare func-
tion, and the Rawlsian Welfare function. Under these criteria, inecient outcomes can
certainly emerge.
357 Comparative Statics24
A few obvious questions spring to mind. Would a player always prefer to be part of a
larger group? Would a player always prefer to be part of a group with stronger relative
preference?
7.1 Varying Payos
The full treatment of this issue is left to future research. In this subsection I provide
only an illustrative example.
Example 6 (Increased Payos). Let G4 = (10;10;4=5;3=5), and 	 be such that 	A d
	B.




b ) = (5;12;16;9), and
so by Theorem 2, it must be that (G4;c	) = f!aag. Clearly, average payos at this
point are given by UA(!aa) = 4=5 and UB(!bb) = 2=5.
Now suppose that Group B payos are modied such that their preference for action
b is magnied. Precisely, suppose that G4 is transformed to ^ G4 = (10;10;4=5;4=5). It




b ) = (5;16;16;5), and so by Theorem 2, it
is now the case that (^ G4;c	) = f!abg. Average payos now are given by UA(!ab) =
UB(!ab) = (9=19)(4=5) < 2=5. And so Group B's payos have gone down.
Now suppose that the Group B payos are modied again, with their preference





b ) = (5;16;19;2), and by Theorem 2, it is
still the case that ( ^ ^ G4;c	) = f!abg. Average payos now are given by UA(!ab) =
(9=19)(4=5) and UB(!ab) = 9=20 > 2=5. Thus Group B's average payo has increased.
7.2 Varying Group Size
24[This section is incomplete and will be nished soon]
368 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new coordination game in the hope of shedding some light on
how behaviour might develop in societies with heterogeneous agents. The environment,
the \Language Game", deviates from existing large population models in one simple but
important way: there are two distinct homogeneous groups with pairwise interactions
occurring both within- and across-group.
Three properties matter for equilibrium selection in the Language Game. They are
(i) group size, (ii) group payos, and (iii) the rates at which the groups react - \group
dynamics". Any agent always desires to be part of a more reactive group, but does not
always long for greater numbers in their group or for more polarized preferences. While
interesting, the results are not robust. That is, for a given game, assumptions on the
likelihood of behavioural mutations, and the full connectedness of the population were
essential.
However, the fragility of the results may not be the weakness it rst appears. For
example, while the results of Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that any equilibrium
can be selected for appropriately dened mutations, I know of no examples where the
Ising model dynamics of Blume (1993) select dierent long run equilibria to those
of KMR. But they can be shown to for an open set of parameters in the Language
Game (Neary, 2010a). Another major limitation of existing large population pure
coordination problems, is that equilibrium selection is robust to network architecture,
with uniform adoption of the locally risk-dominant action stochastically stable for any
network (Peski, 2010). An immediate consequence of moving the Language Game to
arbitrary networks, is that both network topology and the specics of the dynamics
matter strongly for equilibrium selection (Neary, 2010a).
Evolutionary game theory has typically focused on the many dierent and interest-
ing ways in which behaviour adapts in large populations. However, in my opinion, there
has been too little attention on whether or not the stage games accurately capture all
situations in which large populations engage. In a companion paper, (Neary, 2010b), I
dene a new class of large population games called \Multiple-Group Games" (MGGs).
The key feature of a MGG is that the population is partitioned into groups, with players
interacting pairwise with potentially anyone from the population. The only constraint
is that within-group interactions must be symmetric. Across-group interactions can be
37anything, as long as each player has the same strategy set available in each. This adds
heterogeneity in a surprisingly tractable way. Perhaps the greatest advantage of this




Let ! and !0 be elements of 
. Write ! >a !0 if [!]A  [!0]A and [!]B  [!0]B, and ! a !0 if
[!]A < [!0]A or [!]B < [!0]B. Write ! >a !0 if ! >a !0 and ! 6= !0, and ! a !0 if both [!]A > [!0]A
and [!]B > [!0]B. States !0 and !00 are comparable, !00 ?a !0, if !0 >a !00 or !00 >a !0 or both, while
!0 and !00 are incomparable, !0 ka !00, if !0 a !00 and !00 a !0. The pair (
;>a) is a complete lattice
with bottom element !bb and top element !aa.
A nonempty   
 is a chain, if for all !0;!00 2 , !0 ?a !00. For a given chain , dene
()NE = f! 2 j8!0 2 ; ! >a !0g, and ()SW = f! 2 j8!0 2 ; ! 6a !0g. A nonempty   

is an anti-chain, if for any !0;!00 2  with !0 6= !00, it is the case that !0 ka !00. For a given anti-chain
, dene ()SE = f! 2 j8!0 2 ; [!]A  [!0]Ag, and ()NW = f! 2 j8!0 2 ; [!]B  [!0]Bg.
A down set is a nonempty set D  
, where if !0 2 D, and !00 2 
 is such that !00 6a !0, then
!00 2 D. A principal down set is a down set of the form f!g
# := f!0 2 
j!0 6a !g. Similarly, an up
set is a nonempty set U  
, where if !0 2 U and !00 2 
 is such that !00 >a !0, then !00 2 U. A
principal up set is an up set f!g
" := f!0 2 
j!0 >a !g. The intersection of two principal down sets
is a principal down set, and !0 ^ !00 denotes the element, referred to as the meet of !0 and !00, such
that f!0g
# \ f!00g
# = f!0 ^ !00g
#. Similarly, !0 _ !00, referred to as the join of !0 and !00, denotes the
element where f!0g
" \ f!00g
" = f!0 _ !00g
". For any set Q  
, use Q# (Q") to denote the down (up)
set generated by Q. That is, Q# = [!2Q f!g
#.
If !0;!00 2 
 are such that !0 6a !00, then the interval [!0;!00] is dened as [!0;!00] := f!0g
" \
f!00g
# = f! 2 
j!0 6a ! 6a !00g. If !0 k!00, then [!0;!00] = ;. A nonempty subset Q  
 is said to
be convex if [!0;!00]  Q for all !0;!00 2 Q with !0 6a !00. Both up sets and down sets are convex.
For any nonempty Q  
, dene the lower boundary of Q by (Q)  := f! 2 Qj f!g
# \ Q = !g.
Similarly dene the upper boundary by (Q)+ := f! 2 Qj f!g
" \ Q = !g. The lower and upper
boundaries each form an anti-chain. For any pair !0;!00 2 Q#, say that ! 2 Q is join-irreducible in
Q, if !0 _ !00 = ! implies !0 = ! or !00 = !. Similarly, for any pair !0;!00 2 Q", say that ! 2 Q is
meet-irreducible in Q, if !0 ^!00 = ! implies !0 = ! or !00 = !. The sets of join-irreducible and meet-
irreducible elements of Q are denoted (Q)   and (Q)++, and referred to as the total lower boundary
and the total upper boundary of Q respectively. (Q)   and (Q)++ can each be viewed as a union of
\horizontal" row chains r1;:::;rm or as a union of \vertical" column chains c1;:::;cn, where for any
!ik 2 ci and !jl 2 cj 6= ci, !ik k!jl.
Dene a metric, kk : 
  
 ! f0;:::;Ng, on 
 as follows. For any !0;!00 2 
, let k!0;!00k = P
K=A;B j[!0]K   [!00]K j. For a given set Q  
 and state ! 62 Q, interest will often focus on the
state(s) in Q, that is (are) closest to !. That is, in the set

!0 2 Qj!0 2 argmin^ !2Q k!; ^ !k
	
. Most
importantly, for a given convex set Q, and an element ! 62 Q such that there exists an element
!0 2 (Q)++ with ! >a !0, then min^ !2Q k!; ^ !k is attained by some !? 2 (Q)++.
B Constructing Basins of Attraction
Let 2
 denote the power set of 
. Given a mapping 	 : 
 ! 
, consider the inverse image map
	  : 2
 ! 2
 dened for every nonempty Q  
 by 	 (Q) = f! j	(!) 2 Qg. In constructing the
basins of attraction, the following result is used repeatedly.
Lemma 6. The following are equivalent:
391. If L  
 is a down set, then 	 (L) is a down set
2. 	 is monotone.
Proof. (1 ) 2) It is enough to restrict attention to principal lower sets, since if (f!1g
# ;:::;f!ng
#) is
a collection of principal lower sets, then [n
j=1 f!jg
# is a down set. For every ! 2 
 we have
that ! 2 	  
f	(!)g
# 
. This by assumption is a lower set, so if !0 2 
 is such that !0 6a !,
then !0 2 	  
f	(!)g
# 
. Clearly 	(!0) 6a 	(!) and hence 	 is monotone.
(2 ) 1) Let ! 2 
 and dene Q = 	  
f	(!)g
# 
. Provided Q 6= ;, consider some !0 2 Q. Clearly
for every !00 2 
 with !00 6a !0, we have that 	(!00) 6a 	(!0) 6a !, which gives that
!00 2 Q. Thus Q is a down set. Finally, we note that for any L  
, it is the case that
	(L) = 	([!02L f!0g) = [!02L	(!0), and combining this with the fact that the union of a
collection of lower sets is a lower set yields the desired result.
If neither condition of Lemma 2 is satised, then 









. Dierent monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment processes have no aect on
basins of attraction in this case. Thus both partitions are equivalent to fV(!bb);V(!aa)g.








. I show how to construct V(!bb) (the construction of V(!aa)
follows analogously). There is no need to show how to construct V(!ab) when E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag,


















and for each n  1, dene Bn := 	  
Bn 1
. Finally, dene B1 :=
S1
n=0 Bn.
Lemma 7. For any monotonic Group-Darwinian dynamic 	,
1. For all n  0, Bn  Bn+1.
2. 	  
B1
= B1 = V(!bb).
Remark: By part 1, the sets fBng are weakly increasing in n. By part 2 the iterative procedure
eventually it stops. That is, there exists an ^ n 2 N such that for all n  ^ n, Bn = B^ n.
Proof. 1. The proof is by induction. It is true by denition for n = 0. By Lemma 6 and the
fact that 	(!) 6a ! for each ! 2 
A;ba, it must be that for any lower set Q  
A;ba, that
Q  	 (Q). And so the claim is true for n = 1. Assume it is true for n = k. We have










where the third equality follows from the denition of 	 , and the inclusion from the inductive
step. Thus the claim holds for k + 1.
402. The rst equality is clear using part 1 and the fact that 
 is nite. The second inequality follows
due to the convexity of the basins of attraction (Lemma 3).
The entire class of monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment processes is too large to manage in
a tractable way, and so I restrict attention to those that vary at constant rates. Any constant rate
dynamic, 	, satises one of two properties: 	A d 	B, or 	B d 	A. I consider each case separately.
There are three types of scenario to consider: those with E(G) = f!bb;!aag and !ab 2 
B;ab;
those with E(G) = f!bb;!aag but instead !ab 2 
A;ba; and those where E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag. I
ignore the second of these for reasons that will become clear soon.
1. 	A d 	B.
When E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag, or E(G) = f!bb;!aag with !ab 2 
B;ab, it is clear that for
any ! 2 
A;ab \ 
B;ba, we have 	(!) 2 
A;ab. And so by Lemma 9 it must be that,
V(!bb) = D1 = B1 = B0
2. 	B d 	A.










, it must be that [	(!)]A  nA






















++. To this end, I proceed in a slightly roundabout way. First
it will be useful to dene the following operator,  = (A
A;B
B) : 






[!]K   K; if UK(a;!) < UK(b;!);
[!]K ; if UK(a;!) = UK(b;!);
[!]K + K; if UK(a;!) > UK(b;!);
Clearly,  = (A
A;B
B) agrees with constant rate process 	 = (	A;	B







. Now dene D0 = B0 and let us perform repeated
applications of   on D0. That is, for all n  ^ n dene Dn =  (Dn 1) \ 
. To help manage
this, dene C0 = (D0)+, and for each n < ^ n, dene the following Cn+1 := (Dn+1)+n(Dn)+.
That Cn is a nonempty anti-chain for each n < ^ n is clear. It should also be clear that for all
n < ^ n   1, (Dn+1)+ = ([n
j=0Dj)+.
Now we are ready to proceed in calculating D^ n. Recall that Groups A and B respond at
constant rates A and B respectively. There are two cases to consider
(a) !ba 2 
A;ab.
















































a   2   kA;kB + 1

; ngenA




For all n  ^ k = ^ n   1, Dn = Dn 1 [  (Cn 1)#. Diculties arise in calculating C^ n and
hence D^ n, since it must be that 	 ((C^ n 1)SE) = ;. Precisely, these diculties arise at



















+ B > NB
So there are 3 cases to consider: kB < kA, kB > kA, and kB = kA. Before analysing each














































a   2   (^ k + 1)A;NB

; ngenA




























0;^ kB + 1 + rA

; ngenA
 kB = kA















There are two cases to consider,













0;^ kB + rA + 1

; ngenA















a   2   ^ kA   rB;NB

; ngenA
(b) !ba 2 
A;ba.














































a   2   kA;kB + 1

; ngenA
When !ba 2 
A;ab and 	B d 	A, there are only two cases to consider: ^ k = kB < kA,
and ^ k = kB = kA. Remainders are again dened as in equation 19.































a   2   (^ k + 1)A;NB

; ngenA
 kB = kA


































It is almost immediate that V(!bb) = B^ n = D^ n \ 
A;ab, and so we have computed what we set
out to achieve.
43C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.
It is enough to show the existence of a state ! 2 













b . I show only












1. Observe that the weak inequality is strict when N is even.
2. When nB
a = de and nA
a = de, ; 2 R, a sucient condition for nB
a > nA
a is that  >  + 1.
This sucient condition yields the required conclusion since
nB
a > nA
a (= q(N   2) + 1 > (1   p)(N   2) + 1 + 1
() q(N   2) > (1   p)(N   2) + 1
() N
 




p + q   1

2 + 1
() N > 2 +
1
p + q   1
Proof of Lemma 3.
Consider the map 	 ^ m : 
 ! 
, and dene an equivalence relation 	 on 
 by, !0 	 !00 ()
	 ^ m(!0) = 	 ^ m(!00). The equivalence relation 	 partitions 
 into the quotient set 









	 ^ m(!0) 6a 	 ^ m(!00). Now x !0 <a !00 <a !000 with !0 	 !000. Then, by dening the natural mapping
|	 : 
 ! 
= 	, it must be that
|	(!0) 6	 |	(!00) 6	 |	(!000) = |	(!0)
Proof of Lemma 5.
Cases 1 and 2 are analogous. I prove only the rst.
First, note that since 
A;ba is an down-set and that 	(!) 6a !, for all ! 2 
A;ba, then the constraint
that !? 2 (
n
A;ba)  is trivially satised since (
n
A;ba) is itself an up=set. Second, recall that

A;ba  
A;ba, with equality generically. Even non-generically, for suciently large m, we have
	m(!) = !bb, for all ! 2 
A;ban(nA
a   1;0).






A;ba  9!00 2 
;(!0 ! !00) 2 h0
o








A;ba); and g(h0)  
o
We show that C(!;) is attained by h? for all   jV(!bb)j.
The proof is by induction. First consider the case where  = 1.
Clearly ! is the only state in 
A;ba which can be the initial state of an edge in h0, so its im-
mediate successor, !o lies in 
n
A;ba. For each ! 2 
A;ba, dene the following set, D(!) := n




. By the denition of (
n
A;ba)  ,we have that !o >a
^ !; for some ^ ! 2 (
n
A;ba) . So the cost of this path h0 is at least c	(h0) = k!o;	(!)k 
k!?;	(!)k = c	(h?). Clearly then,
c	(h?) = C(!;1)
Now for the inductive step.
Assume that for some , 2    j(
A;ba)j 1, and for all ! 2 
A;ba we have that c	(h?) = C(!;).
Fix ! 2 
A;ba. Let !o be the immediate successor of ! in some path ho that is cost minimizing over
all paths h0 2 H(!;
n
A;ba), satisfying g(h0)   + 1, i.e. that c(ho) = C(!; + 1). It is clear that
!o 2 









If !o 2 argmin^ !2(
n
A;ba)  k^ !;	(!)k, then we have c	(ho) = c	(h?). So we will assume !o 2 
A;ba.





where !?? 2 argmin^ !2(
n
A;ba)  k^ !;	(!o)k, is the path of minimum cost in H(!o;
n
A;ba) in 
or fewer steps. i.e.
c(h00) = C(!o;)
Take the edge (! ! !o) and glue this on to the initial node of h00, !o. Call this new path h000. We
have shown that c(h000) = c(ho) where
h000 := f(! ! !o)g [ f!o ! !??g
Let us now show that c	(t000)  c	(t?). There are two cases to consider:
1. ! ?a !o.
It must be that either !o 6a ! or ! <a !o.
 !o 6a !.
We have that 	(!o) 6a 	(!). Therefore, D(!)  D(!o), so we can choose !?? =
!?. Hence c	(h000) = k	(!);!ok + k!??;	(!o)k  k!??;	(!o)k = k!?;	(!o)k 
k!?;	(!)k = c(h?).
45 ! <a !o.
It must be that 	(!) 6a 	(!o) <a !o. So, while now D(!o)  D(!), we can again choose
!?? = !?. In this case









































= k!o;	(!o)k + k!?;	(!)k
 k!?;	(!)k
= c	(h?)
2. ! ka !o.
There are three cases to consider:
 !o 6a 	(!).
This implies that 	(!o) 6a 	(!), and so we have that D(!)  D(!o). Again, we
can choose !?? = !?, and so c	(h000) = k	(!);!ok + k!??;	(!o)k  k!??;	(!o)k =
k!?;	(!o)k  k!?;	(!)k = c	(h?).
 !o >a 	(!).
It is clear that argmin^ !2(
n
A;ba)  k^ !;!ok  D(!) \D(!o). So, again setting !?? = !?,
we have that









































= k!o;	(!o)k + k!?;	(!)k
 k!?;	(!)k
= c	(h?)
 !o ka 	(!).
Without loss of generality we can assume that [	!]A < [!o]A and [	!]B > [!o]B. If
	(!o) and 	(!) cannot be ordered but D(!) \ D(!o) 6= ;, then the result is immediate.
So assume D(!) \ D(!o) 6= ;, with [	(!)]A < [	(!o)]A and [	(!)]B > [	(!o)]B. In this






A   [	(!)]A =
k!?;	(!)k, where the rst inequality follows by assumption, the second by monotonicity,
and the third since D(!) \ D(!o) = ;.
Proof of Theorem 2.






























46Lemma 8 below is key in computing the minimum of c	(h0) and c	(h00) over all h0 2 H(!ab;
A;ba)
and all h00 2 H(!ab;
B;ab). Lemma 9 shows that when both groups adopt at constant rates, the
partition of 
 into regions of preference is always closely related to the basins of attraction. For reasons
of simplicity, Lemma 9 is stated for the generic case only. Both proofs are omitted. That of Lemma 8
proceeds along similar lines to Lemma 5, while that of Lemma 9 is simple.
Lemma 8. Suppose E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag, and let 	 be a monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment
process such that both groups adapt at constant rates. Then,
1. For all ! 2 
ab, the minimum of c	(h0) over all paths h0 2 H(!;

































[	m(!0)]A + [	m(!0)]B  NA; for all m
[	(!)]A + [	(!)]B  NA and 	B d 	A
[	m(!0)]A + [	m(!0)]B  NA; for some m; and 	A d 	B
where,
 !? 2 argmin^ !2
B;ab k!ab; ^ !k
 !?? 2 argmin^ !2
B;ab k	(!); ^ !k
 !??? 2 argmin^ !2
B;ab k	k(!); ^ !k
 k = minm min^ !2
B;ab k	m(!); ^ !k
2. For all ! 2 
ab, the minimum of c	(h00) over all paths h00 2 H(!;

































[	m(!0)]A + [	m(!0)]B  NA; for all m  ^ m
[	(!)]A + [	(!)]B  NA and 	A d 	B
[	m(!0)]A + [	m(!0)]B  NA; for some m; and 	B d 	A
where,
 !? 2 argmin^ !2
A;ba k!ab; ^ !k
 !?? 2 argmin^ !2
A;ba k	(!); ^ !k
 !??? 2 argmin^ !2
A;ba k	k(!); ^ !k.
 k = minm min^ !2
A;ba k	m(!); ^ !k
Lemma 9. Suppose E(G) = f!bb;!ab;!aag, and let 	 be a monotonic Group-Darwinian adjustment
process such that both groups adapt at constant rates. Then,
if 	A d 	B; then V(!aa)  
B;ab; V(!bb) = 
A;ba and V(!ab)  
A;ab \ 
B;ba
if 	B d 	A; then V(!aa) = 
B;ab; V(!bb)  
A;ba and V(!ab)  
A;ab \ 
B;ba
if 	B d 	A; then V(!aa) = 
B;ab; V(!bb) = 
A;ba and V(!ab) = 
A;ab \ 
B;ba




!aa respectively. Since the construction of ?
!bb, parallels exactly the construction
of ?
!aa, we construct only the !-trees ?
!ab and ?
!aa.
Since V(!bb), V(!ab), and V(!aa) are convex (Lemma 3), we have that for every pair !0 2 V(!bb)
and !00 2 V(!aa) such that !0?!00, there exists ^ ! 2 V(!ab) such that !0 <a ^ ! <a !00. Furthermore,
both groups adapt at equal rates, so by lemma 9 boundaries and total-boundaries of basins of attraction
coincide. We have
(V(!bb))+ = (V(!bb))++ =
 
! j [!]A + [!]B = nA
a   1
	
; if genA 




a   1;0); if ngenA
(V(!ab))  = (V(!ab))   =

! j [!]A + [!]B = nA
a
	
(V(!ab))+ = (V(!ab))++ =

! j [!]A + [!]B = N   nB
b
	
(V(!aa))  = (V(!aa))   =
 
! j [!]A + [!]B = nB
a
	
; if genB 




a ;0); if ngenB
 Construction of ?
!aa.
For any !aa-tree, !aa, dene
h0(!bb;!aa) =

(!0 ! !00) 2 !aa




(!0 ! !00) 2 !aa

!0 = !ab or !0 is a successor of !ab
	
Any !aa-tree, !aa, must satisfy exactly one of the following four properties,
1. 
(1)
!aa: h0(!ab;!aa)  h0(!bb;!aa)
2. 
(2)
!aa: h0(!bb;!aa)  h0(!ab;!aa)
3. 
(3)
!aa: h0(!bb;!aa) \ h0(!ab;!aa) = ;
4. 
(4)





We show that ?
!aa must possess property 
(1)
!aa.


















for some m  0
o
where c	(h?) = (nB
a   NA). While h? above is dierent for the nongeneric case, it is easy to
see that the cost c	(h?) is unchanged.
Decompose h0(!bb;!aa) into paths h0 and h00 where h0 2 H(!bb;
n





= c	(h0) + c	(h00). By Lemma 5, the minimum of c	(h0) is attained
by h = f(!ab ! !??)g, where !?? 2 (V(!ab)) . Because 	 ^ m(!??) = !ab for all !?? 2 V(!ab),
an upper bound for h0(!bb;!aa) is given by







a  NA, and kA = kB, for all !?? 2 (V(!ab))  and all m  0, it must be that nA
a 
[	m(!??)]A+[	m(!??)]B  NA. If nA












































b   NA   1

Otherwise, it follows easily that minm min^ !2
B;ab k	m(!??); ^ !k is attained at m = ^ m and
^ ! = (NA;NB   nB
b + 1), so that the bound in equation 21 binds.
{ 
(1)
!aa: This exactly attains the bound in equation 21.
{ 
(2)
!aa: This exactly attains the bound in equation 21, but only when nA





A  NA   nB
b for some k  1, and nongenericA all hold. Otherwise
there exists h0 = h(!ab;!aa)nh(!bb;!aa) with c	(h0) > 0.
{ 
(3)
!aa: In this case, it is clear that since h(!bb;!aa) can be decomposed into h0 and h00 as




> c	(h??). Coupling this with the
fact that the minimum cost path in H(!ab;!aa) has cost equal to c	(h??) = NB   nB
b ,
yields the desired result.
{ 
(4)
!aa: Follows along similar lines to 
(3)
!aa.
 Construction of ?
!ab.











!0 = !aa or !0 is a successor of !aa
	
By Lemma 5 the path of minimum cost from !bb to 
n
A;ba is attained by h0 = (!bb;!?)
where !? 2 (
n
A;ba) . But note in this case that (
n
A;ba)   V(!ab). Thus dene
h? =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :





























Both if genericA or ngenericA, c	(h?) = nA
a . A similar analysis shows that c	(h00) is minimized
over all h00 2 H(!aa;!ab), by h?? where
h?? =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :

































!ab: h0(!bb;!ab) \ h0(!aa;!ab) = ;
2. 
(2)
!ab: h0(!bb;!ab)  h0(!aa;!ab)
3. 
(3)
!ab: h0(!aa;!ab)  h0(!bb;!ab)
4. 
(4)





Recall that V(!ab) is sandwiched between V(!bb) and V(!aa), in the sense that V(!bb)  V(!ab)#
and V(!aa)  V(!ab)". Thus, unless genA and genB and V(!ab) =

! j [!]A + [!]B = NA	
, in
which case property 
(4)
!ab may hold due to D(!bb)\D(!aa) 6= ;, then a straightforward geometric
argument shows that ?
!ab must possess property 
(1)























Proof of Theorem 3.





From equations (15)-(17), it must be that
nA
a  nA
b   NB (24)
nB
b  nB
a   NA (25)
and so generically
nA
a  NA   nA
a + 1 (26)
nB
b  NB   nB
b + 1 (27)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, I construct minimum cost !-trees of !bb;!ab, and !aa for any
constant rate dynamic. Denote these by ??
!bb, ??
!ab, and ??
!aa respectively. Since the construction of
??
!bb, parallels exactly the construction of ??
!aa, I construct only ??
!ab and ??
!aa.
 Construction of ??
!ab.
The result hinges on the following fact.
Fact 1. The cost of ?
!ab from equation (16) cannot be improved upon.
Proof. ?
!ab must contain paths h?(!bb;!ab) and h?(!aa;!ab).
Consider h?(!bb;!ab). By Lemma 6 the rst edge must be of the form (!bb ! !?) where
!? 2 
n
A;ba. Without loss of generality we can choose !? = (nA
a ;0), and the remaining






the only costly edge of h?(!aa;!ab) an be chosen to be (!aa ! (NA;NB   nB








!ab must contain paths h??(!bb;!ab) 2 H(!bb;!ab) and h??(!aa;!ab) 2 H(!aa;!ab).
Consider h??(!bb;!ab). It must contain a costly transition out of 







!ab can be chosen again. So that we can set h??(!bb;!ab) = h?(!bb;!ab).
Similarly we can choose, h??(!aa;!ab) = h?(!aa;!ab).






which is equal to that of ?
!ab as in Theorem 2.
 Construction of ??
!bb.
There are two cases to consider.
{ 	A d 	B.
By Lemma 9, when 	A d 	B, V(!bb)  
A;ba. Since it is now possible that (
n
B;ab)+ \
V(!aa) 6= ;, the minimum of c	(^ h) over all ^ h 2 H(!aa;V(!bb)) has edges of positive cost 








which coincide exactly with the min-
imum cost !bb-tree from Theorem 2, ?
!bb, with cost given by equation 15.
{ 	B d 	A.
Suppose that 	 = (	A



























b  NB, attained in equation 15 is still attainable by the !bb-tree, ?
!bb, con-
structed in Theorem 2, and so c	(?
!bb) is an upper bound for c	(??
!bb). The other candi-
date !bb-tree, ^ !bb, has paths h(!ab;!bb) and h(!aa;!bb), where h(!aa;!bb)  h(!aa;!bb).









NW. Thus, ^ !bb has cost given by
c	(^ !ab) = c	(!ab; ^ !) + c	(!aa; ^ ^ !)
= NB   nB






There are two cases to consider:
 nB
b  NA   nA
a + 2.
Then,
c	(^ !ab) = (NB   nB
b + 1) + nB
b
 (NB   nB
b + 1) + (NA   nA






where the rst inequality follows by assumption, the second using (26) and (27).
 nB
b < NA   nA
a + 2.
51Then,
c	(^ !ab) = (NB   nB
b + 1) + (NA   nA






using (26) and (27).
Proof of Theorem 4.
Consider part 1 when (NA;0) 2 V(!aa).
1. Construction of ?
!bb.
This is straightforward. The minimum cost path h 2 H(!bb;!aa) must involve a transitioning
out of 
A;ba. Regardless of rates of evolution, it is always the case that (nA
a ;0) 2 V(!aa), since











 , and so by Lemma 5, the path of minimum cost from !bb to (nA
a ;0) is
to transition there immediately, in the generic case, and transition to (nA
a   1;0) and then to
(nA
a ;0) in the non-generic case. Either way, this path h(!bb;(nA
a ;0)) has cost of nA
a . Clearly











a ;0)); for some m  0
o
, with c	(h?) = nA
a .
2. Construction of ?
!aa.
In the same way that Lemma 5 rested on the observation that min^ !2
n
A;ba k	k(!); ^ !k is
increasing in k for all ! 2 
A;ba, this subcase of Theorem 4 hinges on the following Lemma.
There are two subcases to consider.
Lemma 10. Suppose E(G) = f!bb;!aag and !ab 2 V(!aa). If 	 is a constant rate dynamic,
then for all ! 2 V(!aa) \ 
B;ba, it is the case that
min
^ !2V(!bb)
k!; ^ !k  min
^ !2V(!bb)
k	(!); ^ !k (28)
Proof. When 	A d 	B the result is immediate, since V(!bb) = 
A;ba by Lemma 9. So with
	B d 	A, there are two cases to consider: !ba 2 V(!bb) and !ba 62 V(!bb).
 !ba 2 V(!bb).
Clearly (V(!bb))+ can be uniquely decomposed into a collection of column chains fcig
n
i=1,
where for any !ik 2 ci and !jl 2 cj 6= ci, it must be that !ik ka !jl. Now note that for any
! 2 V(!aa) \ 
B;ba, it must be that argmin^ !2V(!bb) k^ !;!k is attained by either f!ikg
where !ik 2 ci and [!ik]B = [!]B, or by f!ik;!jlg where !ik 2 ci, !jl 2 cj 6= ci, with
[!ik]B = [!]B and [!jl]B = [!ik]B   1 and [!jl]A = [!ik]A + 1.
For all ! 2 V(!aa) \ 
B;ba with [!]B   kB  0, it must be that j[!]B   [	!)]B j >
j[!]A   [	!)]A j and hence (28) holds. If [!]B   kB  0, the result is trivial.
We proceed to a contradiction. Suppose for simplicity's sake that argmin^ !2V(!bb) k^ !;!k
is attained by !ik 2 ci where [!ik]B = [!]B, and consider the interval [!ik;!]. Simi-
larly suppose that argmin^ !2V(!bb) k^ !;	(!)k is attained by !jl 2 ci where [!jl]B = [!]B,
and consider the interval [!jl;	(!)]. Now note that if k!jl;	(!)k < k!ik;!k, then
	 (!jl) >a !ik, and hence !ik 62 V(!bb).
52 !ba 2 V(!aa).






A;ab. And again a similar inductive argument to






so the result follows naturally.
Armed with Lemma 10, the remainder of the proof now follows by a simple counting argument
as in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 7.
The proof uses the following two properties of the de function. For any x;y 2 R,
dxe + d xe =

0; if x 2 Z
1; if x 62 Z
dxe + dye   1  dx + ye
It is sucient to show that !ab 2 (G;c	), implies !ab is socially ecient. For !ab 2 (G;c	), by


















Now consider equations 29 and 30 for generic parameters of G (we show only the case where (1 q)N +




= dq(N   2) + 1e   d(1   q)N + (2q   1)e
= dq(N   2) + 1e + d (1   q)N   (2q   1)e   1
 d(N   2)(2q   1)e
where the rst equality followed by plugging in for nB
a and nB
b , the second by the rst property of
de described above, and the nal inequality by the second property of de along with some algebraic
manipulation. Thus inequalities 29 and 30 can be restated as
NA  d(N   2)(2q   1)e (31)
NB  d(N   2)(2p   1)e (32)









(N   1)(2q   1)
m
(33)




(N   1)(2p   1)
m
(34)
Finally, note that inequalities 31 and 32 imply those in 33 and 34.
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